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707 
DYING FOR LEAVE: HOW SOCIETAL VIEWS ON 
END-OF-LIFE CARE PUSHED BALLARD TO 
EXPAND THE MEANING OF CARE UNDER  
THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in Ballard v. Chicago Park 
District
1
 shook employers and employment law attorneys
 
to their core,
2
 
forcing reevaluation of what it means to care for a family member with a 
serious medical condition under the Family and Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA).
3
 Ballard, a former employee of the Chicago Park District, 
requested FMLA leave to take her terminally-ill mother on vacation to Las 
Vegas as part of her mother’s end-of-life plan, constructed by her mother 
and her mother’s hospice team.4 The Seventh Circuit agreed with Ballard 
that her employer should have granted FMLA leave for the trip.
5
 In fact, 
Ballard created a circuit split on the issue,
6
 placing the Seventh Circuit at 
odds with the First and Ninth on the meaning of care in the context of 
traveling.
7
 By holding that an employer improperly denied FMLA leave to 
an employee accompanying her dying mother on a Las Vegas vacation,
8
 
the Seventh Circuit stretched the FMLA’s meaning of care when applied 
to a seriously ill family member.
9
 Ballard expanded the meaning of care 
 
 
 1. Ballard v. Chi. Park Dist., 741 F.3d 838 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 2. See, e.g., Jeff Nowak, What!?! Time Caring for Mom in Las Vegas is FMLA Leave, FMLA 
INSIGHTS (Nov. 26, 2012), http://www.fmlainsights.com/what-time-caring-for-mom-in-las-vegas-is-
fmla-leave/; Russell Samson, Momma, Let’s Go to Las Vegas on FMLA Leave!, DICKINSON LAW (Feb. 
6, 2014, 11:26 AM), http://www.dickinsonlaw.com/2014/02/momma-lets-go-to-las-vegas-on-fmla-
leave/.  
 3. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2012). 
 4. Ballard, 741 F.3d at 839–40. 
 5. Id. at 839. 
 6. The issue is “what qualifies as ‘caring for’ a family member under the [FMLA],” and 
whether the definition changes when the parties are traveling. Id. at 839. 
 7. Compare id. at 842 (finding participation in ongoing medical treatment is not requisite 
element of providing care under FMLA, either at home or while traveling), with Tellis v. Alaska 
Airlines, Inc., 414 F.3d 1045, 1047 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding “caring for a family member with a serious 
health condition ‘involves some level of participation in ongoing treatment of that condition’” (quoting 
Marchisheck v. San Mateo Cty., 199 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 1999))), and Tayag v. Lahey Clinic 
Hosp. Inc., 632 F.3d 788, 791 & n.2 (1st Cir. 2011) (finding employee “properly” withheld argument 
that caring for husband during travel unrelated to husband’s medical treatment “would itself be 
protected leave”). For an in-depth discussion on traveling while taking FMLA leave, see Heather N. 
Collinet, Gambling on Court Interpretations of Care: Approving Leave for Travel under the FMLA, 10 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 345 (2015). 
 8. Ballard, 741 F.3d at 843.  
 9. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) (2012). 
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by finding aspects of end-of-life care acceptable as caregiving activities.
10
 
The unique facts of this case and the court’s emphasis on the nature of the 
mother’s terminal illness introduce the subtle notion that the meaning of 
care loosens when applied to a dying family member. This case creates a 
lower threshold that was likely not intended by Congress and will frustrate 
employers, but is very much in line with American values and societal 
norms regarding end-of-life care.
11
  
This Note analyzes the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of FMLA care 
in Ballard. Part II provides an overview of the FMLA, focusing on the 
family-member-care provision, and various judicial interpretations of this 
provision. Part III explains the facts and judicial rationale in Ballard. 
Then, Part IV analyzes societal and congressional views of end-of-life 
care. Finally, Part V of this Note explores the significance of the Ballard 
decision and the risk of employee abuse. While the FMLA does not 
distinguish or discriminate on its face between a seriously ill family 
member and a dying one,
12
 this Note explores how the definition of care 
likely becomes more flexible if the employee requests FMLA leave to tend 
to a terminally ill family member. This flexibility will have a huge impact 
as the largest generation begins to depart while under the care of 
employed, younger family members.
13
 While Congress likely did not 
intend the FMLA’s meaning of care to be taken so far,14 Ballard’s 
expansion of the meaning of care is well in line with other legislative 
actions addressing elderly care and societal views that the dying deserve 
the best care, even beyond what medicine can provide.
15
   
 
 
 10. Ballard, 741 F.3d at 838. 
 11. Our society accepts a belief that terminally ill suffering should be met with “presence . . . 
rather than abandonment.” Courtney S. Campbell, Suffering, Compassion, and Dignity in Dying, 35 
DUQ. L. REV 109, 123 (1996).  
 12. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11). 
 13. By 2030, the baby boomer generation will move into the elderly age bracket, 65 and older. 
JENNIFER M. ORTMAN ET. AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AN AGING NATION: THE OLDER POPULATION IN 
THE UNITED STATES 4 (2014), https://www.census.gov/prod/2014pubs/p25-1140.pdf.  
 14. In 29 U.S.C. § 2601, Congress lays out the findings and purposes of the FMLA. Children and 
births are explicitly mentioned, but death or dying is never mentioned. See id.  
 15. See infra Part V.a. Support for hospice care stems from moral reasoning and less from 
economic rationalization. Roi Livne, Economies of Dying: The Moralization of Economic Scarcity in 
U.S. Hospice Care, 79 AM. SOC. REV. 888, 889 (2014).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss3/8
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II. THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT 
A. History and Purpose 
Congress enacted the FMLA in 1993 to help working Americans 
“balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families.”16 
Recognizing the need for federal intervention into employer practices,
17
 
the FMLA created the first set of federal statutes that required many 
employers to provide leave for employees to address family and medical 
needs outside the workplace.
18
 In his appeal to the President to sign the 
FMLA, Senator Pell stated: 
We may not be able to prevent the tragedy of a child dying or 
becoming very sick, but certainly we can provide to that child the 
comfort of his or her family, and provide the family with the chance 
to help, to show love . . . For the sake of the next generation, and for 
the sake of the sick children and elderly today who have no one at 
home to care for them, we must as a Nation decide that we will not 
make our workers choose between their loved ones and their jobs.
19
 
Since the United States remains one of the only post-industrial countries 
without a national family leave policy in place, Congress sought to devise 
a program that would meet the needs of working family members without 
disrupting the economy or overburdening employers.
20
  
The Legislature recognized that a growing number of women were 
entering the workforce.
21
 By the time the FMLA was enacted, seventy-
four percent of women ages twenty-five to forty-five had employment 
outside the home.
22
 Furthermore, longer life spans and the aging baby-
boomer generation increased many workers’ caregiving duties.23 Finding 
that women were more likely to face conflicts between caring for families 
and maintaining jobs outside the home,
24
 Congress believed that the 
FMLA would create better job security, family stability, and even advance 
 
 
 16. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1). 
 17. See 139 CONG. REC. 1691 (1993). In the three years preceding the FMLA, one study showed 
that 300,000 people lost their jobs due to lack of job-guaranteed medical leave. Id.  
 18. Maegan Lindsey, Comment, The Family and Medical Leave Act: Who Really Cares?, 50 S. 
TEX. L. REV. 559, 562 (2009).  
 19. 137 CONG. REC. 24992 (1991). 
 20. 139 CONG. REC. 1691.  
 21. Id.  
 22. Lindsey, supra note 18, at 562. 
 23. 139 CONG. REC. 1691. 
 24. See U.S.C. § 2601(a)(5) (2012).  
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gender equality.
25
 The FMLA would also ensure that working Americans 
would have healthcare when they needed it the most.
26
 Even though leave 
under the FMLA would be unpaid, the employee would maintain health 
benefits.
27
  
The FMLA was also designed to promote employers’ economic 
interests.
28
 A study cited by Congress prior to passing the Act found that 
hiring and training cost an employer far more than extending family or 
medical leave to an existing employee.
29
 In addition, the findings also 
demonstrated that quitting or losing jobs increases the unemployment rate 
and dependence on social welfare programs.
30
  
To strike the balance between work duties and family and medical 
obligations, the FMLA offers eligible employees
31
 up to twelve weeks of 
leave for any of five reasons: (1) birth of the employee’s child; 
(2) placement of an employee’s child via adoption or foster care; (3) care 
for the employee’s spouse, child, or parent if that individual suffers from a 
serious health condition; (4) impairment of employee’s ability to perform 
job due to his or her own serious health condition; and (5) a spouse, child, 
or parent called to active duty.
32
 If the employee is granted FMLA leave to 
care for a family member with a serious health condition, the employee 
also has the option to take leave on a reduced leave schedule or 
intermittently.
33
 After the leave has concluded, the employee must be 
reinstated to the previous position or to an equivalent position with the 
same benefits.
34
 
 
 
 25. See Kelli K. Garcia, The Gender Bind: Men as Inauthentic Caregivers, 20 DUKE J. GENDER 
L. & POL’Y 1, 5–6 (2012). 
 26. 139 CONG. REC. 1691.  
 27. Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 2614(c)(1). 
 28. 139 CONG. REC. 1691.  
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. Findings indicated that large business that implemented private family and medical leave 
policies were saving millions on training and replacement costs. AT&T, for example, reported a 
savings of $15 million each year. Id.  
 31. In order to be eligible for FMLA leave, an employee must meet two requirements: (1) the 
employee must be requesting leave from an employer for which he or she has been employed under for 
at least twelve months; and (2) the employee must have worked at least 1,250 hours during the twelve-
month period leading up to the leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A)(i)–(ii) . For more information about 
calculating the twelve months of employment, see 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(b) (2016). Even if the 
employee meets these requirements, certain exclusions apply. For example, the employee must be 
employed at a location in which the employer has at least fifty employees within seventy-five miles. 
29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(B)(ii); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(e). 
 32. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A)–(E). This Note focuses on the third option for FMLA entitlement: 
care for the employee’s spouse, child, or parent if that individual suffers from a serious health 
condition. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(C). 
 33. Id. § 2612(b)(1). 
 34. See id. § 2612(b)(2).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss3/8
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B. Caring for a Family Member with a Serious Health Condition 
An eligible employee may take FMLA leave to care for a family 
member with a serious health condition.
35
 However, certain restrictions 
limit how this leave can be used. 
1. Who Is a Family Member? 
The caregiving provision of the FMLA only applies to the employee’s 
spouse,
36
 son, daughter,
37
 or parent.
38
 A parent could include “a biological, 
adoptive, step or foster” parent or even one “who stood in loco parentis to 
the employee.”39  
2. What Is a Serious Health Condition? 
The eligible employee may only take FMLA leave to care for his or her 
eligible family member if that family member suffers from a “serious 
health condition.”40 The FMLA gives a brief yet broad definition of a 
serious health condition by including any “illness, injury, impairmentb or 
physical or mental condition” involving either inpatient care or 
“continuing treatment by a health care provider.”41 Regulations by the 
Department of Labor (DOL) further define inpatient care and continuing 
treatment by health care providers.
42
 This definition is applicable to 
 
 
 35. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(C). 
 36. An eligible employee in a married same-sex relationship is fully entitled to FMLA leave to 
care for his or her spouse. The Department of Labor (DOL) altered the definition of “spouse” in 
February 2015 to recognize spouses of legally recognized same-sex marriages. For more information, 
see Jeff Nowak, Now That Same-Sex Marriage is a Constitutional Right, How Do Employers 
Administer FMLA Leave?, FMLA INSIGHTS (June 29, 2015), http://www.fmlainsights.com/now-that-
same-sex-marriage-is-a-constitutional-right-how-do-employers-administer-fmla-leave/.  
 37. A “son” or “daughter” can be a biological child, adopted child, foster child, stepchild, legal 
ward, or “a child of a person standing in loco parentis.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.122(d) (2016). If the son or 
daughter is over eighteen, the eligible employee may only seek FMLA leave if that son or daughter is 
“incapable of self-care because of a mental or physical disability.” Id. “Incapable of self-care” 
describes a situation when one “requires active assistance or supervision to provide daily self-care in 
three or more of the activities of daily living.” Id. § 825.122(d)(1) (2015). 
 38. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C). 
 39. 29 C.F.R. § 825.122(c). In-laws, for example, are not included in the definitions of “parent” 
or “son or daughter.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.122(c)–(d); see Tsun v. WDI Int’l, Inc., No. 12-00051 LEK-
KSC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44995 (D. Haw. Mar. 28, 2013), aff’d, 585 F. App’x 489 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(finding employee ineligible for FMLA leave because his ill father-in-law did not meet the definition 
of parent under the FMLA).  
 40. 29 USC § 2612(a)(1)(C). 
 41. Id. § 2611(11)(A)–(B). 
 42. 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.114–115. 
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situations in which the employee seeks FMLA leave for self-care and 
when the employee seeks leave to provide care to family members.
43
  
This one-sentence statutory definition creates a threshold test but does 
not distinguish in severity or lethalness. It is worth noting, however, that 
death is not considered a serious health condition.
44
 Despite clarity and 
commentary from the DOL,
45
 the actual meaning of a “serious health 
condition” in practice has often thwarted employers46 and created a 
plethora of litigation.
47
 However, in cases where it is clear to all parties 
involved that the family member is dying or terminally ill, it is a criterion 
rarely contested. 
3. What Is Care? 
Even if all the previously stated criteria have been met with respect to 
eligibility,
48
 relationship, and serious health condition, the employee is 
only able to take FMLA leave if he or she will be providing care.
49
 Since 
the FMLA is not intended to “cover every family emergency,” the 
meaning of care is critical to understanding the parameters of the FMLA.
50
 
Unfortunately for both the courts and employers, “care” is not defined 
anywhere in the statute.  
 
 
 43. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) (entitling employee to take FMLA leave for his or her own serious 
health condition); id. § 2612(a)(1)(C) (entitling employee to take FMLA leave to care for a family 
member with a serious health condition). 
 44. See Brown v. J.C. Penney Corp., 924 F. Supp. 1158 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (rejecting argument that 
managing father’s affairs the month following father’s death was protected leave under FMLA because 
“serious health condition” does not apply after the family member has died).  
 45. 29 C.F.R. § 825.113.  
 46. Employers struggle to understand what qualifies as a serious health condition, regardless of 
its legal interpretation, leaving many employers to adopt a broader definition when approving 
employees for FMLA leave. Nicole Buonocore Porter, Finding a Fix for the FMLA: A New 
Perspective, a New Solution, 31 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 327, 348 (2014). For an in-depth 
discussion on what constitutes a “serious health condition,” see William McDevitt, Evaluating the 
Current Judicial Interpretation of “Serious Health Condition” Under the FMLA, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 
697 (1997). 
 47. See, e.g., Seidle v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 871 F. Supp. 238 (E.D. Pa. 1994).  
 48. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 49. See 29 USC § 2612(a)(1)(C). See, e.g., Mora v. Chem-Tronics, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1192 
(S.D. Cal. 1998). 
 50. Fioto v. Manhattan Woods Golf Enters., LLC, 270 F. Supp. 2d 401, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), 
aff’d, 123 F. App’x 26 (2d Cir. 2005). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss3/8
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C. What Does It Mean to Give Care? 
In the absence of a definition from Congress, the DOL has provided 
guidance on the meaning of care.
51
 The DOL provides some direction on 
when an employee is “needed to care for a family member” under the 
FMLA.
52
 DOL regulations specify that care incorporates both physical and 
psychological care.
53
 The regulations provide an array of examples of care. 
Physical care, for example, is needed when “the family member is unable 
to care for his or her own basic medical, hygienic, or nutritional needs or 
safety, or is unable to transport himself or herself to the doctor.”54 
Psychological care could include “providing psychological comfort and 
reassurance which would be beneficial to a [family member] who is 
receiving inpatient or home care.”55 Courts have freely admitted that the 
threshold for psychological care is set quite low.
56
 While the DOL offers 
many examples of what encompasses care, real-life situations leave courts 
guessing whether a case’s facts closely relate to the regulation’s 
examples.
57
  
In an attempt to provide clarity to employers, courts have identified 
different guidelines on what types of activities constitute care under the 
FMLA. Unfortunately, these guidelines are not congruent throughout 
every circuit, and some inconsistencies arise.
58
 Three of these guiding 
rules provide insight into how various courts interpret care. First, many 
circuits, including the Seventh, find that visiting a family member who is 
suffering from a serious health condition does not constitute care.
59
 
 
 
 51. If the Court has determined that Congress has not given guidance on a specific issue, the 
Court may then turn to regulations promulgated by the appropriate agency. See generally Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In the FMLA context, courts examine 
the DOL’s regulations. See Scamihorn v. Gen. Truck Drivers, 282 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 52. 29 C.F.R. § 825.124 (2016). 
 53. Id. § 825.124(a). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. “Our sister court in Maine, however, has twice ruled that the concept of ‘psychological care’ 
includes providing even a minimal level of comfort to a sick relative.” Fioto v. Manhattan Woods Golf 
Enters., LLC, 270 F. Supp. 2d 401, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (referring to two Maine district court 
decisions: Plumley v. S. Container Inc., No. 00-140-P-C, 2001 WL 1188469, at *1 (D. Me. Oct. 9, 
2001) and Brunelle v. Cytec Plastics, Inc., 225 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D. Me. 2002)) aff’d, 123 F. App’x 26 
(2d Cir. 2005). 
 57. See Lindsey, supra note 18, at 569 (“While the regulations offer guidance, the litigation 
arising in each of these areas make clear that many situations do not fit neatly within each of the 
situations . . . .”). 
 58. The issue of this Note, the impact of traveling while caring for a family member, is one 
example of an inconsistent directive. 
 59. See, e.g., Overley v. Covenant Transp., Inc., 178 F. App’x 488 (6th Cir. 2006); Cianci v. 
Pettibone Corp., No. 95 C 4906, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4482 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 7, 1997), aff’d, 152 F.3d 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Second, when the family member receives some sort of care as an 
incidental benefit of a non-care activity, the employee will not be entitled 
to FMLA leave under 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C).
60
 Third, when the timing 
of the care appears to burden the employer more than it benefits the family 
members, courts may find the employee is not entitled to FMLA leave.
61
  
1. Visitation Is Not Care 
Courts often inquire into the employee’s level of participation in the 
family member’s care.62 For example, Overley, a truck driver, missed 
work in order to tend to her disabled daughter, who was residing in an 
assisted-living facility.
63
 During this visit, Overley did her daughter’s 
laundry, met with an employee of the facility to discuss matters related to 
her daughter’s finances, and made a trip to her daughter’s new potential 
residence.
64
 The Sixth Circuit found that Overley did not provide an 
adequate level of care to invoke FMLA leave because she was not actively 
participating in any ongoing care.
65
 Instead, Overley was simply visiting 
her daughter to “check on her care” and engage in meetings that were 
neither time-sensitive nor conducted for any care-related reason.
66
 The 
Sixth Circuit rejected the notion that FMLA covered visitation that did not 
involve some direct participation in the family member’s care.67  
 
 
723 (7th Cir. 1998); Fioto v. Manhattan Woods Golf Enters., LLC, 270 F. Supp. 2d 401 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003), aff’d, 123 F. App’x 26 (2005).  
 60. See Tellis v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 414 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2005); Scamihorn v. Gen. 
Truck Drivers, 282 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2002); Lane v. Pontiac Osteopathic Hosp. No. 09-12634, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61003 (E.D. Mich. June 21, 2010); Leakan v. Highland Cos., No. 96-CV-75445-DT, 
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20381 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 19, 1997). 
 61. See, e.g., Overley, 178 F. App’x 488; see also Lindsey, supra note 18, at 578–79. 
 62. See, e.g., Overley, 178 F. App’x 488; Cianci, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4482, at *1; Fioto, 270 
F. Supp. 2d 401. But see Scamihorn, 282 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding employee’s trip to visit his 
depressed father was more than mere visitation due to the employee’s involvement in his father’s 
counseling and daily care). 
 63. Overley, 178 F. App’x at 490. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 495. 
 66. Id. Overley’s meetings addressed the state of her daughter’s trust and offered Overley a 
chance to visit a plot of undeveloped land. Id.; see also Gray v. Clarksville Health Sys., G.P., No. 
3:13-00863, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2455, at *18 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 9, 2015) (finding employee was not 
entitled to FMLA leave because “strategizing a plan of physical and mental health for her daughter” 
did not qualify as care). 
 67. Overley, 178 F. App’x at 495; cf. Bell v. Prefix, Inc., 321 F. App’x at 425, 427 (6th Cir. 
2009) (finding employee entitled to FMLA leave while he cared for his hospitalized father because 
employee was actively involved in medical decisions related to father’s care and provided comfort and 
reassurance to his scared father). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss3/8
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The rule that “mere visitation” is not a permissible form of care under 
the FMLA is reiterated in Fioto v. Manhattan Woods Gold Enterprises.
68
 
In Fioto, an employee was terminated after missing work to visit his 
mother, who was in the hospital for brain surgery.
69
 While the employee 
was present inside the hospital during his mother’s brain surgery, the 
employee never directly interacted with his mother.
70
 The only connection 
between the employee and his mother was his physical presence within the 
hospital during the surgery, and the record indicated that his mother might 
not have even known he was there.
71
 The U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York found that mere visitation did not 
constitute care under the FMLA.
72
 The court noted this was a low 
threshold, as even helping with the family member’s medical decisions 
would satisfy the requirement for participation.
73
 
The Seventh Circuit also follows the rule that caring for a family 
member suffering from a serious health condition requires a step beyond 
visitation.
74
 In Cianci v. Pettibone Corporation, the employee learned her 
mother, who lived in Italy, was near death, so the employee sought FMLA 
leave from her employer.
75
 However, the employee’s sister was already 
caring for their mother and meeting her needs, so the Seventh Circuit 
found the employee’s trip was merely a visit unrelated to her mother’s 
care.
76
  
2. Care Does Not Consist of an Incidental Benefit 
Courts have found that even if an employee was actively involved with 
his or her family member’s care, the FMLA does not protect activities in 
 
 
 68. 270 F. Supp. 2d 401, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 69. Id. at 402. 
 70. Id. at 404 (“There is no evidence in the record testimony about Fioto’s interaction with his 
mother or her doctors.”). 
 71. Id. at 405. 
 72. Id. (“Because the language of the statute does not guarantee employees FMLA leave to visit 
an ailing parent, it was incumbent on plaintiff to demonstrate that he was doing something—
anything—to participate in his mother’s care.”). 
 73. Id. (citing Brunelle v. Cytec Plastics, Inc., 225 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D. Me. 2002) (finding 
employee entitled to FMLA leave because he helped his ailing father’s doctors make medical 
decisions regarding his father’s care)). 
 74. Cianci v. Pettibone Corp., 152 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 1998), aff’g No. 95 C 4906, 1997 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 4482 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 7, 1997).  
 75. Id. at *5–6. 
 76. Id. at *19–20. 
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which that care is an incidental benefit.
77
 In Tellis v. Alaska Airlines, the 
employee requested FMLA leave so that he could fly across the country to 
retrieve a family vehicle and drive the vehicle back to his home.
78
 The 
employee argued that his wife needed a vehicle for transportation, and 
delivering the family car would bring her psychological comfort at a time 
when she was experiencing late-stage pregnancy complications. In 
addition, the employee argued that he called his wife throughout his time 
on the road, and their conversations gave her psychological support and 
assurance.
79
 The court found that the FMLA demands that providing care 
to a family member must involve actual care, and such care did not occur 
in this case.
80
 Even though securing the car may have been a comfort to his 
wife, the court found the emotional benefit to the wife was merely an 
indirect benefit of an unprotected activity.
81
 In addition, the phone calls 
between the employee and his wife could not be enough to qualify for 
FMLA-protected leave, regardless of the moral support that the calls 
provided.
82
 
Even though the Ninth Circuit held that comforting phone calls alone 
are not enough to qualify as care, “daily conversations” and “constant 
presence” can qualify as care.83 In Scamihorn v. General Truck Drivers, 
the employee sought leave to care for his father, who was suffering from 
depression.
84
 Since his father lived out of state, the employee traveled to 
his father’s home to provide care during his father’s depression.85 The 
employee spent his time conversing with his father, helping with daily 
chores, and occasionally driving his father to the doctor and 
psychologist.
86
 In fact, the employee came to the aid of his father based on 
the recommendation of his father’s doctor, who believed that the son’s 
 
 
 77. See Lindsey, supra note 18, at 571 (“[C]ourts have regularly held that where physical and 
psychological care is merely an incidental consequence of an unprotected activity, FMLA leave will 
not be granted.”). 
 78. 414 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2005). The employee flew from Seattle to Atlanta to retrieve the car, 
and his trip took nearly four days. Id. at 1046, 1048. 
 79. Id. at 1047. 
 80. Id.  
 81. The court found the “unprotected activity” was securing and driving the car. This activity is 
unrelated to the wife’s serious health condition: pregnancy complications. In addition, the court took 
note that the activity took the husband away from his wife during her actual care. Id. at 1048. 
 82. Id. (“Common sense suggests that the phone calls . . . do not fall within the scope of the 
FMLA’s ‘care for’ requirement”). 
 83. Id. at 1047 (citing Scamihorn v. Gen. Truck Drivers, 282 F.3d 1078, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 84. Scamihorn, 282 F.3d at 1080. The father’s depression was brought on by his daughter’s 
murder by her ex-husband. Id.  
 85. Id. at 1081. 
 86. Id.  
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presence would help the father manage his depression.
87
 The Ninth Circuit 
found that the employee actively participated in his father’s care by 
ensuring his father continued his prescribed psychological treatment, by 
conversing with his father about the issues surrounding his depression, and 
assisting his father with daily tasks.
88
  
While the court relied mostly on the regulation’s definition of care to 
hold that the employee’s actions fell within the scope of the FMLA, the 
court also noted the father’s doctor’s testimony that the employee’s “help” 
was beneficial to the father, citing the doctor’s testimony to show the 
meaning of care under the law aligns with the meaning of care in a 
medical sense.
89
 Therefore, the court concluded that the care provided by 
the employee was in line with the meaning of care under the FMLA.
90
 
Another federal district court found certain caring activities to be too 
indirect to qualify for FMLA leave.
91
 In Lane v. Pontiac Osteopathic 
Hospital, the employee missed work after his mother’s basement had 
flooded.
92
 His mother had diabetes, high blood pressure, and arthritis, and 
the employee frequently helped her prepare meals and transport her to her 
doctor appointments.
93
 The employee claimed that cleaning up the 
basement flooding constituted care because standing water in the basement 
was a breeding ground for hepatitis, another disease his mother had.
94
 The 
district court found that the employee’s actions did not meet the level of 
care required by the FMLA because the employee was unable to show that 
his mother was unable to clean up the basement herself, or in the 
alternative, that the basement needed to be immediately cleaned in order to 
meet his mother’s “basic medical, hygienic, or safety needs.”95 
 
 
 87. Id. at 1084. 
 88. Id. at 1088. 
 89. Id. Courts often cite to testimony from a health professional that the care was necessary. In 
fact, 29 U.S.C. §2613 enables an employer to require certification from a physician that care is 
necessary prior to approving an employee’s FMLA leave request. Certification or testimony from a 
health professional is not required under the FMLA, but it adds a layer of legitimacy to an employee’s 
FMLA request. 29 U.S.C. §2613 (2015). For more about the role of doctors in FMLA leave, see Mary 
Kalich, Note, Do You Need a Doctor’s Note? Lay Testimony Should Be Sufficient Evidence for FMLA 
Leave Unless Compelling Counter Conditions Exist, 86 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 603 (2012).  
 90. Scamihorn, 282 F.3d at 1088. But see id. at 1089 (Fernandez, J. dissenting) (finding 
employee not needed to care for father because father was self-providing and his wife was fully able to 
care for him). 
 91. Lane v. Pontiac Osteopathic Hosp., No. 09-12634, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61003 (E.D. Mich. 
June 21, 2010).  
 92. Id. at *2–3. 
 93. Id. at *2. 
 94. Id. at *3–4. 
 95. Id. at *11. 
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Whether providing care is an incidental benefit when the activity 
involves travel can be tricky.
96
 In Leakan v. Highland Companies, the 
employee took a trip to visit her in-laws with her newborn son, believing 
her baby should visit with his grandparents.
97
 After being terminated for 
the missed work, the employee claimed that she was needed to care for her 
son on the trip.
98
 The court found that caring for her son was incidental to 
the employee’s desire to take a vacation to visit family, and her actions 
were not covered by the FMLA’s care provision. 99 
3. Timing of Care Is Relevant 
A court is unlikely to find caregiving falls within the scope of the 
FMLA when the care could easily be provided without disrupting the 
employee’s work schedule.100 In Overley, the Sixth Circuit found that the 
employee’s involvement in her disabled daughter’s living situation did not 
constitute care under the FMLA because, in part, the activities were not 
“time sensitive.”101 The court commented that the record gave no reason 
why the employee’s activities needed to conflict with her work 
commitments.
102
 This factor also played a significant role in Lane. That 
court found that the employee was unable to show how cleaning his 
mother’s flooded basement needed to be done immediately.103 The issue of 
urgency appears nowhere in the plain language of the FMLA or any DOL 
regulations.
104
  
Mere visitation, care as an incidental benefit, and timing issues each 
offer insight into courts’ decisions on what constitutes care under the 
 
 
 96. See Collinet, supra note 7, at 361. See also Lindsey, supra note 18, at 571.  
 97. No. 96-CV-75445-DT, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20381, at *11 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 19, 1997). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at *12–13. But see Briones v. Genuine Parts Co., 225 F. Supp. 2d 711 (E.D. La. 2002) 
(holding that employee’s leave to babysit his children so his wife could provide care to their 
hospitalized child was within the scope of the FMLA). 
 100. See, e.g., Overley v. Covenant Transp., Inc., 178 F. App’x 488 (6th Cir. 2006); Pang v. 
Beverly Hosp., Inc., 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 643 (Ct. App. 2000); Lane v. Pontiac Osteopathic Hosp. No. 09-
12634, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61003, at *1 (E.D. Mich. June 21, 2010); see also Lindsey, supra note 
18, at 578–79. 
 101. Overley, 178 F. App’x at 495. 
 102. Id. (“[T]he meeting . . . was not time sensitive and could have been held later . . . . the record 
gives no indication of an immediate need to move her daughter . . . .”). 
 103. Lane, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61003, at *11 (“Plaintiff is required to present evidence that his 
mother’s basement had to be immediately cleaned for her basic medical, hygienic, or safety needs . . . . 
Plaintiff fails to make any such demonstration.”); see also Pang, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 649 (finding no 
reason employee needed to take leave to move her mother into a smaller apartment when the task 
could easily have waited). 
 104. Lindsey, supra note 18, at 579. 
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FMLA, but these factors provide little more than a smell test. The lack of 
clarity creates opportunities for inconsistency among the courts and 
uncertainty for employers. The Ballard decision pounces on the 
uncertainty and introduces a form of hospice care, specifically an end-of-
life trip, into the realm of FMLA-approved caregiving activities.  
III. BALLARD V. CHICAGO PARK DISTRICT 
A. Background 
Beverly Ballard worked for the Chicago Park District when her mother 
was diagnosed with end-stage congestive heart failure, a terminal 
disease.
105
 Ballard, as her mother’s primary caregiver, cooked her mother 
meals, administered medications, injections, and oxygen, bathed and 
dressed her mother, and even drained fluids from her mother’s failing 
heart.
106
 Her mother also received services from a palliative care 
organization, Horizon Hospice.
107
 When discussing end-of-life goals with 
Horizon Hospice’s social worker, Ballard’s mother said that she always 
wanted to take a family vacation to Las Vegas, but she would only be able 
to go if her daughter could accompany her since her daughter was her 
primary caregiver.
108
 The social worker secured funding for the trip 
through the Fairygodmother Foundation, a nonprofit organization that 
provides funding for terminally ill adults to make one last dream a 
reality.
109
 
Ballard requested unpaid FMLA leave to accompany her mother on the 
vacation,
110
 but the Chicago Park District denied the request.
111
 Ballard, 
claiming that she did not receive the denial prior to her departure, traveled 
with her mother as planned in January 2008.
112
 The two “participated in 
typical tourist activities,” and Ballard continued to provide the same sort 
 
 
 105. Ballard v. Chi. Park Dist., 741 F.3d 838, 839 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 106. Id.; Ballard v. Chi. Park Dist., 900 F. Supp. 2d 804, 806 (N.D. Ill. 2012). 
 107. Ballard, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 806. 
 108. Ballard, 741 F.3d at 839. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Parties dispute whether there was sufficient notice to the employer. This issue was addressed 
in the trial court, Ballard, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 813–14, but was not addressed on appeal. Ballard, 741 
F.3d at 839–40 (“The parties dispute . . . whether Ballard gave the Park District sufficient notice, but 
these issues are not germane to this appeal and we will ignore them.”). Thus, it is not an issue relevant 
to this Note. 
 111. Ballard, 741 F.3d at 839–40. 
 112. Id. at 840. 
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of care she had been giving her mother at home.
113
 At one point during the 
trip, Ballard had to take her mother to the local hospital for additional and 
unanticipated medication.
114
 However, Ballard and her mother had no 
plans to seek any medical treatment related to her heart condition while in 
Las Vegas, and Horizon Hospice had not arranged or suggested any 
services throughout the trip.
115
 
Ballard returned to work, but several months later she was fired.
116
 
Chicago Park District cited her “unauthorized absences accumulated 
during her trip” as the reason for her termination,117 following 25 years of 
employment.
118
 Ballard filed a lawsuit against the Chicago Park District 
for intentional interference with her FMLA rights.
119
 Chicago Park District 
moved for summary judgment, arguing that Ballard did not provide care 
for her mother in Las Vegas because “the trip was not related to a 
continuing course of medical treatment.”120 
B. District Court 
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois addressed 
whether Ballard could be entitled to take FMLA leave to care for her 
dying mother in Las Vegas as a matter of law.
121
 In an attempt to clarify 
the meaning of care under the FMLA, the district court made two major 
delineations: the care given did not need to correspond to any treatment;
122
 
and acceptable care under the FMLA is not confined to any location.
123
 
Both of these conclusions broaden the scope of care to include an end-of-
life trip so long as the level of physical care provided on the trip would be 
enough to satisfy care requirements had the same care been administered 
at home.
124
  
 
 
 113. Id. The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois elaborated on the activities, stating 
“Ballard spent time with her mother playing slots, shopping on the Strip, people-watching, and dining 
at restaurants.” Ballard, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 807. 
 114. Ballard, 741 F.3d at 840. 
 115. Ballard, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 807. 
 116. Ballard, 741 F.3d at 840. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Ballard, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 806–07 (explaining that Ballard began employment for Chicago 
Park District in 1983 and was fired in 2008). 
 119. Id. at 808. 
 120. Ballard, 741 F.3d at 840. 
 121. Ballard, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 808. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 808–09. 
 124. Id. at 810. 
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The district court rejected Chicago Park District’s argument that 
providing care to a family member with a serious health condition means 
that the care must relate to the treatment of the condition.
125
 The district 
court found no evidence of such connection in the wording of the statute 
or in the regulations issued by the DOL.
126
 The regulations also do not 
provide any relationship between care and a particular location.
127
 In 
addition, the court found that the literal reading of 29 U.S.C 
§ 2612(a)(1)(C) indicates no direct relationship between caring for the 
family member and the family member’s condition.128 A serious health 
condition is simply a prerequisite that enables the eligible employee to 
take leave to provide care to his or her family member.
129
 
This fact is particularly relevant for a family member who is terminally 
ill, such as Ballard’s mother. An individual who is terminally ill may not 
be under any medical treatment during a given time.
130
 A condition that 
entails “continuing treatment by a health care provider” is considered a 
serious health condition under the FMLA.
131
 The district court pointed to 
regulatory guidance that “continuing treatment” does not necessitate active 
treatment.
132
 The district court concluded that requiring care to somehow 
relate to “active medical treatment” runs counter to the definition of a 
serious health condition.
133
  
The district court found “no question” that Ballard’s dying mother 
suffered from a serious health condition and that the care Ballard provided 
to her mother at home was well within the meaning of care under the 
FMLA.
134
 As a result, the district court addressed whether the meaning of 
care changes if the care occurs away from home.
135
 On the trip, Ballard 
provided the identical kind of care she gave her mother at home: helping 
with basic needs such as providing meals, helping with transportation, and 
tending to her mother’s hygienic needs.136 The district court also 
 
 
 125. Id. at 810. 
 126. Id. (“[T]here is no statutory or regulatory text stating . . . that ‘care’ must involve some level 
of participation in the ongoing treatment of the family member’s condition under the FMLA.”). 
 127. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.116(a) (2007)). The regulation cited in Ballard has been amended 
and now appears in 29 C.F.R. § 825.124 (2016) with only minor modifications. See Ballard, 741 F.3d 
at 841 n.1. 
 128. Ballard, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 810. 
 129. Id. at 809. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2) (1995)). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 810. 
 135. Id. at 810–12. 
 136. Id. at 810. 
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acknowledged that the trip was planned and executed without any intent to 
seek medical treatment.
137
 In addition, the district court agreed with 
Chicago Park District that this fact would be fatal to the plaintiff’s claim in 
other circuits, where travel during FMLA leave must relate to medical 
treatment.
138
 Nevertheless, the district court found this rule 
unpersuasive.
139
 To justify this divergence, the district court explained its 
departure from the case law in other circuits.
140
  
Chicago Park District cited to a Ninth Circuit case,
141
 Marchisheck v. 
San Mateo County,
142
 which held that an employee was not entitled to 
FMLA leave when she moved her son to the Philippines.
143
 The district 
court acknowledged that Marchisheck holds that some medical treatment 
must be involved to justify caring for a family member while traveling 
away from home, but the district court disagreed with the basis of the 
Ninth Circuit’s holding.144 The Ninth Circuit found support for this 
holding based on an administrative rule that “suggests” that care would 
incorporate involvement in ongoing treatment.
145
 Even though the Eighth 
and First Circuits have followed this rationale and adopted Marchisheck’s 
holding,
146
 the Ballard district court found that there is not enough textual 
support for this rule in what the regulation “suggest[s].”147 The district 
court also highlighted the Ninth Circuit’s dependency on examples of care 
given in the regulations, but the district court maintained that examples 
cannot create rules without more explicit guidance from the DOL, 
especially when the geographic limitation or ongoing medical treatment 
characteristic is not present in all the examples.
148
 
 
 
 137. Id. at 812–13 (“Ballard has failed to show . . . the end-of-life trip to Las Vegas was part of 
her mother’s ongoing treatment.”). 
 138. Id. at 810–11. 
 139. Id. at 812. 
 140. Id. at 811–12. 
 141. Id. at 810. 
 142. 199 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 143. Id. at 1076 (“Plaintiff’s act of taking [her son] to a foreign country and leaving him with 
relatives . . . did not amount to ‘caring for’ [him] for purposes of the FMLA.”). 
 144. Ballard, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 810–11. 
 145. Id. (citing Marchisheck, 199 F.3d at 1076). 
 146. The Eight Circuit adopted the Marchisheck holding in Miller v. State Departmentt of 
Economic Development, 467 F. App’x. 536, 540–41 (8th Cir. 2012). See Ballard, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 
810. The First Circuit adopted the Marchisheck holding in Tayag v. Lahey Clinic Hospital, 632 F.3d 
788, 791 n.2 (1st Cir. 2011). See Ballard, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 810. 
 147. Ballard, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 811.  
 148. “It would be a mistake to use non-exclusive examples to impose limits on that broad and 
direct definition.” Id. at 811–12 (citing the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of 29 C.F.R. §825.116 (2008) 
in Gradilla v. Ruskin Manufacturing, 320 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2003), withdrawn per stipulation of 
parties, 328 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
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The district court concluded its analysis of the meaning of care under 
the FMLA and denied summary judgment to Chicago Park District by 
stating: 
That Ballard provided [care] to her mother while [her mother] went 
on an end-of-life trip does not detract from the fact that her 
mother’s basic medical, hygienic, and nutritional needs could not be 
met without Ballard’s assistance. So long as the employee provides 
“care” to the family member, where the care takes place has no 
bearing on whether the employee receives FMLA protections.
149
 
The district court altered the meaning of care used in other circuits by 
holding two bright line rules: care provided need not correspond to any 
ongoing treatment and acceptable care under the FMLA is not confined by 
location.
150
 The district court’s decision ignored the burden its new broad 
expansion would thrust upon employers, and it missed an easy opportunity 
to limit the holding to the facts of the case, namely, that the purpose of the 
end-of-life trip itself was a form of care.
151
  
C. Seventh Circuit 
Chicago Park District appealed the issue of whether an employee is 
eligible for FMLA leave when the employee’s care occurs while traveling 
but is unrelated to any ongoing medical treatment.
152
 The Seventh Circuit 
affirmed the decision of the district court, holding that it would not limit 
the meaning of care in circumstances involving travel.
153
  
Reiterating the sentiments of the lower court, the Seventh Circuit found 
no evidence within the FMLA statute indicating that providing care 
adjusts in meaning when there is an adjustment in geography.
154
 The court 
noted that if Congress truly meant to limit care to one place, Congress 
would have legislated as much.
155
 Since Congress did not provide a 
definition of care within the statute, the court also turned to the DOL’s 
 
 
 149. Id. at 812 (footnote omitted). 
 150. Id. at 809. 
 151. The court openly acknowledges the possibility that an end-of-life-trip is a rational form of 
psychological care when it suggested this argument could have possibly defeated defendant’s lack of 
ongoing treatment argument. Id. at 813. 
 152. Chicago Park District did not appeal whether all forms of care must require a connection to 
ongoing medical treatment. Rather, the defendant narrowed its issue to the context of travelling. 
Ballard v. Chi. Park Dist., 741 F.3d 838, 839–40 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 153. Id. at 840. 
 154. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2612). 
 155. Id. (noting 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) does not say “to care at home for”). 
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regulations,
156
 specifically 29 C.F.R. § 825.116.
157
 Once again, the court 
agreed with the district court that section 825.116 fails to express any 
geographic limitations on providing care.
158
 Instead, the Seventh Circuit 
found that the regulations express an “expansive[]” definition of care by 
including both “physical and psychological care.”159 However, the Seventh 
Circuit adopted a slightly different interpretation of section 825.116(a). 
The regulation provides, in part, “[t]he term [‘needed to care for’] also 
includes providing psychological comfort and reassurance which would be 
beneficial to a [family member] with a serious health condition who is 
receiving inpatient or home care.”160 Inpatient care and home care both 
suggest specific places—either in a hospital, a hospice, a residential 
medical care facility,
161
 or within one’s own home.162 While the district 
court found this location-specific language to offer nothing more than 
illustrative examples of what might constitute care,
163
 the Seventh Circuit 
suggested that location may be relevant in cases where the employee is 
providing psychological care.
164
 Ballard provided physical care to her 
mother.
165
 Even though the court used this logic to further distance the 
facts of the case with the example in the regulation, this seemingly lends 
some credibility to the holdings in other circuits that location may be 
relevant when determining if the provided care qualifies under the 
FMLA.
166
 Regardless of this dictum, the Seventh Circuit found that the 
care Ballard provided to her mother in Las Vegas fell well within the 
meaning of care under the FMLA.
167
  
By reaching the same conclusion as the district court, the court also 
needed to explain its conscious split from the First and Ninth Circuits.
168
 
Like the district court, the Seventh Circuit based its rationale on the 
language of the statute and in the regulations, highlighting the other circuit 
 
 
 156. Id. at 840–41 (“Still, the FMLA does not define ‘care’. . . . We therefore turn to the 
Department of Labor’s regulations to clear away any lurking ambiguity.”). 
 157. 29 C.F.R. § 825.116 (2008). 
 158. Ballard, 741 F.3d at 841. 
 159. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.116). 
 160. Id. at 841 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.116(a)). 
 161. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11)(a) (2012) (confining the meaning of inpatient care to “a hospital, 
hospice, or residential medical care facility). 
 162. 29 C.F.R. § 825.116(a). 
 163. Ballard v. Chi. Park Dist., 900 F. Supp. 2d 804, 811–12 (N.D. Ill. 2012). 
 164. See Ballard, 741 F.3d at 841 (“[T]his example only concerns psychological care.”). 
 165. Id. 
 166. See, e.g., Tellis v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 414 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2005). For a more in depth 
discussion of traveling during FMLA leave, see Collinet, supra note 7. 
 167. Ballard, 741 F.3d at 843. 
 168. Id. at 842 (“We respectfully part ways with the First and Ninth Circuit on this point.”). 
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decisions’ failure to “explain why certain services provided . . . at home 
should be considered ‘care,’ but those same services provided away from 
home should not be.”169  
The court missed an important opportunity to justify the decision and 
distinguish it from other circuits’ decisions. Instead of disregarding the 
travel component, the court should have emphasized that, while the 
physical care provided in both Chicago and Sin City was the same 
legitimate physical care eligible for FMLA leave, the purpose of the trip 
itself was a legitimate form of psychological care. In fact, the court 
acknowledges that had the employer inquired with Ballard’s mother’s 
health care providers, the employer would have learned that the purpose of 
the trip was in the hospice care “context,” which the court implies is not an 
abuse of the FMLA.
170
  
After concluding that Ballard’s help for her mother in Las Vegas fell 
within the meaning of care under the FMLA, the Seventh Circuit 
addressed concerns that this precedent would encourage “opportunistic 
leave-taking.”171 First, the court specified that the appeal of summary 
judgment was not an appropriate forum to debate whether Ballard used the 
FMLA to take her own vacation, rather than to be a caregiver to her 
mother.
172
 Second, the court noted that certification requirements from a 
health care provider under the FMLA still apply.
173
 An employer 
concerned about FMLA abuse is still able to request certification of the 
need for care and the serious health condition by a health care provider.
174
 
The court followed this point with the aside, “any worries about 
opportunistic leave-taking in this case should be tempered by the fact that 
this dispute arises out of the hospice and palliative care context.”175 
In summary, the Seventh Circuit took a much broader view on the 
meaning of care than the First and Ninth Circuits
176
 by holding an eligible 
employee may use FMLA leave under section 2612(a)(1)(C)
177
 to take a 
trip unrelated to any medical treatment so long as the employee is still 
providing a level of physical or psychological care that satisfies the 
statute. While the holding seems innocuous, forms of care that could be 
 
 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 843. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §2613 (2012)). 
 175. Id. 
 176. See discussion supra Part III.b. 
 177. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C). 
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provided without much interference in the workplace, such as meal 
planning and administering medication, could now justify an entire week 
away from work. Like the district court, the Seventh Circuit makes no 
reference to the new burden that this expansive rule places on employers. 
It, too, misses the opportunity to justify its expansion with the very 
important fact that the trip itself was a form of psychological care. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Both the district court and the Seventh Circuit failed to explicitly state 
that the hospice care factor justifies such an expansion. Yet the courts 
clearly relied on the end-of-life trip factor to justify its decision.
178
 Its 
failure to tie this unique factor to its decision to expand the meaning of 
care beyond that of other circuits creates opportunities for abuse and takes 
the meaning of care, now unbridled from solely the hospice end-of-life trip 
context, beyond the intent of Congress.
179
 However, when the Ballard 
decision is re-examined in the end-of-life care context it becomes much 
more rational and consistent with the FMLA .  
The Ballard decision sent employers spinning into uncertainty, as the 
meaning of care under the FMLA plunged further into fragmented 
confusion.
180
 Employers likely struggle with this Seventh Circuit decision 
because Ballard broadens the meaning of care under the FMLA,
181
 
provides the opposite holding of a First Circuit case with near identical 
facts,
182
 and offers no reference to the balance between employer 
economic interest and employee health and family demands.
183
  
A. Expanding the Meaning of Care by Incorporating Theories of Hospice 
Care  
Ballard expanded the meaning of care beyond its existing 
interpretation in other circuits.
184
 In essence, the decision disregards other 
 
 
 178. See note 176 and accompanying text. 
 179. See discussion infra Part IV.c. 
 180. See supra note 2. 
 181. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C). 
 182. Tayag v. Lahey Clinic Hosp., Inc., 632 F.3d 788 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 183. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (2015) (the purpose of the FMLA is “to balance the demands of the 
workplace with the needs of families”); see discussion infra Part IV.b. 
 184. Ballard v. Chi. Park Dist., 741 F.3d 838 (7th Cir. 2014); see supra Part II. Despite the circuit 
split on the issue of providing care while traveling, some argue there is a trend among employers and 
legislators to lessen the burden on employees with family care-giving duties. See Margaret Wright, 
Comment, A Caring Definition of “Care”: Why Courts Should Interpret the FMLA to Cover 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss3/8
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circuits’ guideline that when care is an incidental benefit of some other 
activity, such as a vacation, that care falls outside the scope of the 
FMLA.
185
 However, the fact that Ballard’s mother was terminally ill and 
under hospice care becomes crucial to understanding how the Seventh 
Circuit reached its decision and how that decision can be squared with the 
purpose of the FMLA. Not only is the employee continuing to provide the 
same level of care to the family member,
186
 but the purpose of the trip, an 
end-of-life trip, also begins to resemble a form of care itself due to the 
involvement and recommendations of health care professionals.
187
  
Ballard reiterated and adhered to the DOL’s construction of care as 
consisting of two camps: physical care and psychological care, both of 
which are meant to be interpreted broadly.
188
 While the court asserts that 
the care Ballard provided was physical care, it omitted the discussion of 
the actual purpose of the trip itself, which was to offer legitimate 
psychological care.
189
 The court avoided overtly expanding the meaning of 
care but added new activities into the allowable forms of care.
190
 A closer 
look at American moral values surrounding end-of-life care support the 
court’s implied rationale that hospice care, with its non-traditional 
methods, provides a powerful form of care worthy of inclusion under 29 
U.S.C. §2612.  
Hospice care, a form of care that seeks to meet the needs of terminally 
ill patients,
191
 is a less clinical form of care with a focus on less aggressive 
 
 
Unconventional Treatment of Seriously Ill Family Members, 32 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 35, 53–59 
(2015).  
 185. See discussion supra II.c.ii; Tellis v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 414 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 
2005) (finding employee’s leave to retrieve family vehicle had only an indirect benefit to his wife’s 
serious health condition and thus does not constitute care); Leakan v. Highland Cos., No. 96-CV-
75445-DT, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20381 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 19, 1997) (finding care provided to 
employee’s newborn baby was incidental to the main purpose of the employee’s trip, which was to 
introduce newborn to employee’s in-laws). 
 186. Ballard, 741 F.3d at 841. 
 187. Ballard’s mother’s trip was planned by a hospice social worker with consultation from a 
physician and paid for by a non-profit organization. Id. at 843. See supra note 89 for a discussion on 
the role of health care professionals’ recommendations and certification.  
 188. Ballard, 741 F.3d at 841–42. 29 C.F.R. § 825.124(a) (2015); see supra Part II.b; 29 C.F.R. 
§ 825.124 (2015); see also Ballard v. Chi. Park Dist., 900 F. Supp. 2d 804, 809 (N.D. Ill. 2012) 
(finding the definition of care in 29 C.F.R. § 825.116 (2008) to be “expansive”).  
 189. See supra note 244; discussion Part III.b.  
 190. Ballard, 741 F.3d at 842 (“Ballard requested leave in order to provide physical care. That, in 
turn, is enough to satisfy 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C).”). 
 191. Hospice care applies when the patient has received a prognosis of death within six months 
and agrees to forgo life-prolonging treatments. Kathleen Tschantz Unroe and Diane E. Meier, 
Palliative Care and Hospice: Opportunities to Improve Care for the Sickest Patients, 25 NOTRE DAME 
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 413, 415 (2011). 
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medical intervention.
192
 This form of care emphasizes alternative care 
methods that cannot be met in the traditional medical system, such as at a 
hospital.
193
 Hospice care incorporates a wide variety of professionals that 
seek to maximize the dying patient’s comfort while also meeting the 
patient’s “physical, psychological, social and spiritual needs.”194 
Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, policy makers and healthcare 
professionals began to view hospice care as the morally responsible form 
of care for people who are dying and terminally ill, and this ideology has 
drastically changed how Americans view dying.
195
 By 2007, 1.4 million 
Americans had used hospice services,
196
 and national healthcare reform 
has demonstrated Congressional support for the hospice ideology.
197
 In 
addition to meeting a patient’s medical needs, such as medication 
management, hospice care incorporates psychosocial care, such as 
addressing the patient’s spiritual well-being and end-of-life goals, and 
often involves teams of professionals across disciplines.
198
 Hospice care 
has become an important value in American society today as the 
population ages.
199
 Not only does hospice care fit into society’s concept of 
morality, but hospice care is also financially wise because it usually 
requires less aggressive medical treatment and less time in a hospital.
200
 In 
fact, hospice care can even be made available in one’s private home.201  
The relationship between hospice care and acceptable forms of care 
under the FMLA had never been fully explored until Ballard framed a 
seemingly recreational vacation as a component of an end-of-life plan, 
worthy of being classified as care under the FMLA.
202
 The only other case 
that addresses an employee seeking FMLA leave to care for a family 
 
 
 192. Livne, supra note 15, at 889.  
 193. Melissa D.A. Carlson et. al., Hospice Care: What Services Do Patients and Their Families 
Receive?, 42 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1672, 1673 (2007). 
 194. Mayo Clinic, Hospice Care: Comforting the Terminally Ill, MAYO CLINIC (Jan. 16, 2016), 
http://www.mayoclinic.org/healthy-lifestyle/end-of-life/in-depth/hospice-care/art-20048050. 
 195. Livne, supra note 15, at 889.  
 196. Kathy L. Cerminara, Hospice and Health Care Reform: Improving Care at the End of Life, 
17 WIDENER L. REV. 443, 445 (2011).  
 197. Congress drastically increased patient access to hospice care in the Affordable Care Act. 
Cerminara, supra note 196, at 451 & n.52 (citing Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-148, §§ 3140(a), 2302, 124 Stat. 119, 440, 293 (2010)). 
 198. Carlson et. al., supra note 193. 
 199. See Samar M. Aoun et. al., Caregiving for the Terminally Ill: At What Cost?, 19 PALLIATIVE 
MED. 551 (2005).  
 200. Hospice care has been shown to reduce health care costs. See Unroe and Meier, supra note 
191; Livne, supra note 15. 
 201. Paula Lusardi et. al., The Going Home Initiative: Getting Critical Care Patients Home With 
Hospice, CRITICAL CARE NURSE, Aug. 2011, at 46. 
 202. Ballard v. Chi. Park Dist., 741 F.3d 838 (7th Cir. 2014).  
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member in hospice care is Mora v. Chem-Tronics, Inc.
203
 In Mora, the 
defendant employer attempted to argue that its employee was not needed 
to care for his dying son because “hospice care may have sufficed.”204 The 
District Court for the Southern District of California rejected the 
employer’s argument finding no evidence that an employee can only be 
granted FMLA leave if no other options for care exist.
205
 Similar to 
Ballard, the Mora court referenced a physician’s professional opinion of 
the advantages of family care when it declared that the employee’s 
presence provides psychological comfort to his son “who faced death on a 
daily basis.”206 Mora, however, did not expand upon the meaning of care 
because the psychological care coincided with medical treatment.
207
 
Furthermore, the employee participated in medicine administration and 
symptom observation.
208
 This level of involvement in his son’s care, even 
though largely consisting of psychological care, falls in line with the Ninth 
Circuit’s interpretation that care under the FMLA necessitates 
involvement in ongoing treatment.
209
 
Ballard’s caregiving was unrelated to any treatment. Rather, the 
activity was a component of an end-of-life plan devised by her mother’s 
hospice care providers.
210
 When the focus shifts from the activity of 
vacationing in Las Vegas to the goal of providing hospice care to a dying 
woman, Ballard’s leave becomes more in line with the meaning of care.211 
Creating an end-of-life plan is well in line with the definition of 
psychological care in 29 C.F.R §825.124.
212
 Furthermore, hospice care, as 
a practice, has the overwhelming support of both the general public and 
the medical community, which has a legitimizing effect on hospice care’s 
 
 
 203. 16 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (S.D. Cal. 1998). 
 204. Id. at 1206. 
 205. Id. at 1206–07. 
 206. Compare id. at 1207 (citing declaration of son’s physician attesting to psychological comfort 
that employee provided his son during his son’s life-threatening treatment), with Ballard, 741 F.3d at 
839, 843 (emphasizing social worker’s role in planning and securing funding for Ballard’s mother’s 
trip and conversations about trip with mother’s physician). 
 207. The employee provided critical psychological care to his son during his son’s painful spinal 
taps. Mora, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1207. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See Marchisheck v. San Mateo Cty., 199 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 1999); see also discussion supra 
II.c. 
 210. Ballard, 741 F.3d at 839. 
 211. Id. at 842–43. 
 212. 29 C.F.R. § 825.124(a) (2016) defines psychological comfort as “comfort and reassurance 
which would be beneficial to a child, spouse or parent with a serious health condition who is receiving 
inpatient or home care.” For more information about the purpose of an end-of-life trip and its impact 
on the life of the terminally-ill, see the major motion picture THE BUCKET LIST (Warner Bros. 2007). 
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non-traditional approach to care.
213
 Finally, the federal government not 
only approves of hospice care as a practice but also provides funding and 
access for hospice care through Medicare.
214
 While Medicare is unlikely to 
fund end-of-life vacations, the concept of planning for a “good death” is 
an important aspect of hospice care, and it should be incorporated into the 
meaning of care under the FMLA, as it was in Ballard.
215
 
B. Solidifying Circuit Split 
One of the most startling aspects of Ballard is its eerily similar fact-
pattern to Tayag v. Lahey Clinic Hospital, Inc., decided by the First 
Circuit only three years prior.
216
 The employee in Tayag served as the 
primary caregiver for her husband who suffered from a variety of health 
issues including chronic heart disease, a recent kidney transplant, and end-
stage renal failure.
217
 The employee frequently sought FMLA leave for 
caregiving activities such as transportation to doctor appointments and 
administering medication.
218
 Her employer always approved her requests 
for leave, which usually lasted one to two days, until the request in 
question.
219
 The employee’s husband sought to visit his native country, the 
Philippines, for a seven-week spiritual healing trip, but he could not travel 
without his wife due to his need of care.
220
 The employee accompanied her 
husband on the trip, providing the same care she provided him at home.
221
 
The court found the complete absence from work to be beyond the scope 
of the FMLA because the healing pilgrimage did not involve any medical 
treatment and the employee could offer no reason why the trip needed to 
be seven weeks long.
222
  
The First Circuit refused to extend FMLA leave to Tayag on the basis 
that Tayag’s provided care was not enough to justify a seven-week burden 
 
 
 213. Livne, supra note 15, at 889. 
 214. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
MEDICARE HOSPICE BENEFITS 4 (2016), https://www.medicare.gov/Pubs/pdf/02154.pdf; see also 
Cerminara, supra note 196, at 451. 
 215. Daren K. Heyland et. al., What Matters Most in End-of-Life Care: Perceptions of Seriously 
Ill Patients and Their Family Members, 174 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 627 (2006), http://www.cmaj.ca/ 
content/174/5/627.full.pdf; see Ballard, 741 F.3d at 838. 
 216. 632 F.3d 788 (1st Cir. 2011).  
 217. Id. at 789; Tayag v. Lahey Clinic Hosp., Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448 (D. Mass. 2010). 
 218. Tayag, 632 F.3d at 789. 
 219. Id. at 790. 
 220. Tayag, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 449. 
 221. Tayag, 632 F.3d at 790. 
 222. Id. at 792–93. 
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to her employer,
223
 but the court also rejected the argument that the 
purpose of the trip, a spiritual healing journey, merited FMLA coverage.
224
 
Spiritual healing during end-stage renal failure may draw some parallels to 
a last-chance vacation for end-stage congestive heart failure.
225
 Perhaps 
the lack of participation from an institutional care provider delegitimized 
Tayag and her husband’s trip.226  
C.  Legislative Intent to Balance Interests 
The Ballard decision omits any discussion of the burden this expanded 
interpretation places on employers. By expanding the meaning of care, 
employees will be able to leave work more often and for longer periods of 
time.
227
 Presumably, Ballard was not taking FMLA leave in weekly 
increments.
228
 While a family member might require intermittent care or 
care that occurs outside the employee’s work commitments, traveling 
requires the employee to take a continuous period of absence.
229
 As was 
the case in Ballard, the amount of care provided remains identical when in 
town and when travelling, but the difference is the detriment to the 
employer.
230
 The employer has lost more work-product even though the 
employee’s caregiving duties have not changed.231 This surely burdens the 
employer. 
 
 
 223. Id. at 793. 
 224. Id. at 791–92. 
 225. Compare Tayag, 677 F. Supp 2d at 448, with Ballard v. Chi. Park Dist., 900 F. Supp. 2d 804, 
806 (N.D. Ill. 2012). 
 226. Tayag, 632 F.3d at 793 (finding health care provider certification was insufficient and 
spiritual healing was distinct from employee’s husband’s treatment plan). 
 227. Ballard was out of town for an entire week. It is unlikely that the kind of care she provided 
would normally require her to take a full week of leave had she remained at home. Ballard, 900 F. 
Supp. 2d at 807. 
 228. Id. at 806. Ballard served as her mother’s primary caregiver, and her duties “included 
preparing healthy meals; administering her mother’s insulin shots and medicine; operating a pump to 
remove fluids from her mother’s heart; bathing her mother; pushing her in a wheelchair; administering 
oxygen when her mother needed it; providing her mother with transportation; and making sure her 
mother was comfortable.” Id. Ballard did not request FMLA leave from her employer until she began 
planning the trip to Las Vegas. Id. at 806–07.  
 229. The FMLA enables employees to take leave on an intermittent schedule or for a specific 
amount of time up to twelve weeks. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(b) (2012). For a discussion on leave schedules, 
see Megan E. Hladilek, Comment, Can I Go to Chemo?: Protecting Employee Rights to Intermittent 
and Reduced Leave Under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 377 (2006).  
 230. Both at home and while traveling to Las Vegas, Ballard “continued to serve as her mother’s 
caretaker during the trip . . . performing her usual responsibilities.” Ballard v. Chi. Park Dist., 741 F.3d 
838, 840 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 231. Ballard had to request additional FMLA leave in order to make the trip. Ballard, 741 F.3d at 
839–40. 
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 The FMLA was designed to balance the needs of the employer with 
the demands of employees who must balance work and family.
232
 The 
statute specifically identifies the need for balancing between the needs of 
the employer and the need for an employee to meet family demands.
233
 In 
addition, much of the legislative history focuses on the economic impact 
that the FMLA will likely have on the economy and inside individual 
workplaces.
234
 Congress did not intend for the FMLA to overly burden 
employers.
235
 Despite legislative intent to balance employer and employee 
opposing interests, the Ballard decision makes no reference to any 
balancing mechanism.  
V. IMPORTANCE OF THE BALLARD DECISION  
A. Demonstrating Social Values Surrounding Dying 
Ballard not only altered the meaning of care under the FMLA but also 
suggested that caring for a dying family member may not need to be 
balanced against the economic interests of an employer.
236
 The court’s 
heavy reference to Ballard’s mother’s terminal state suggests that care in 
the mother’s final days need not be checked by the economic interests of 
an employer.
237
 Economic costs may be less important when society views 
caring for those who are terminally ill as a moral duty.
238
 Therefore, the 
Ballard decision is best understood in the context of hospice care. 
Compassion and morality support the holding that Ballard indeed provided 
care to her mother, even if that care occurred in a happier place than a 
hospital.
239
 The Ballard decision’s interpretation of care under the FMLA 
was influenced by social values that the dying deserve dignity and care, 
even if it is not economical.
240
 This compassion likely takes the meaning 
of care beyond the intentions of Congress, who sought to balance 
 
 
 232.  29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) (“It is the purpose of this Act—to balance the demands of the 
workplace with the needs of families . . . .”). 
 233. Id. 
 234. See 139 CONG. REC. 1691 (1993); H.R. REP. NO. 103-8, pt. 1, at 60 (1993). 
 235. 29 C.F.R. § 825.101 (2015) (“It was intended that the [FMLA] accomplish [its] purposes in a 
manner that accommodates the legitimate interests of employers . . . .”). 
 236. See discussion supra Part III.b. 
 237. Ballard, 741 F.3d at 839 (emphasizing the trip’s role in the mother’s end-of-life plan, the 
mother’s fatal diagnosis, and the role of charity work and hospice care). 
 238. See Livne, supra note 15. 
 239. See Ballard, 741 F.3d at 839–43. 
 240. See Livne, supra note 15. 
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economic impact with family needs, but it is well in line with social values 
in the United States.
241
  
More Americans are choosing to die at home or outside of hospitals.
242
 
In addition, 75% of American deaths result from chronic illnesses, and 
these individuals often seek hospice and palliative care in their final 
days.
243
 The changing scenery of the dying process has shifted the focus 
away from medicine and towards non-medical intervention, such as 
spiritual and emotional care.
244
 Instead of hospitals filled with doctors, 
those dying in a hospice care environment are likely to interact with social 
workers.
245
 Ballard’s mother planned her trip to Las Vegas with the help of 
a social worker.
246
 Finally, the popularity of hospice care and end-of-life 
planning is likely to grow as the American population ages, with the baby 
boomers entering their elder years.
247
 This form of care is growing in both 
popularity and credibility within the medical community and greater 
public. Thus, Ballard was able to trace its understanding of care to 
evolved public perceptions of care and modern medical professional 
opinions, both of which bolster the holding’s credibility. This cultural, 
moral, and healthcare trend helps reinforce the Ballard rationale that the 
physical care during the trip meets the kind of care the FMLA seeks to 
cover
248
 and the purpose of the trip draws a direct connection to the 
mother’s chosen line of care for her terminal condition.249 
 
 
 241. See Lindsey, supra note 18, at 560–61 (arguing that a broad interpretation of care takes the 
FMLA beyond the scope intended by Congress); see also Collinet, supra note 7, at 384 (“[U]nder the 
current circuit split, lack of clear guidance on the permissibility of traveling ‘to care for’ a family 
member under the FMLA encourages employees to explore limits. This requires employers – as a 
means of minimizing their risk exposure for noncompliance – to adopt policies and processes that in 
some instances exceed that which Congress had in mind when it passed the FMLA.”); 139 CONG. REC. 
1691 (1993) (demonstrating the minor burden or even economic benefit the FMLA would have on 
employers); H.R. REP. NO. 103-8, pt. 1, at 60. 
 242. Nancy Aldrich & William F. Benson, Advance Care Planning: Ensuring Your Wishes Are 
Known and Honored If You Are Unable to Speak for Yourself, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL (2012), 
http://www.cdc.gov/aging/pdf/advanced-care-planning-critical-issue-brief.pdf. 
 243. Carlson et. al., supra note 193, at 1673. 
 244. See Andrew M. Seaman, Hospice Patients More Likely to Die at Home, Receive Efficient 
Care, REUTERS (Nov 11, 2014 4:25 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-hospice-care-cost-
idUSKCN0IV25C20141111. See also Amy S. Kelley & Diane E. Meier, Palliative Care—A Shifting 
Paradigm, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 781 (2010). 
 245. Louise Brown & Tony Walter, Towards a Social Model of End-of-Life Care, 44 BRIT. J. SOC. 
WORK 2375 (2014).  
 246. Ballard v. Chi. Park Dist., 741 F.3d 838, 839 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 247. ORTMAN ET. AL., supra note 13.  
 248. allard, 741 F.3d at 842 (“Thus, at the very least, Ballard requested leave in order to provide 
physical care. That, in turn, is enough to satisfy 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C).”). 
 249. Id. at 839 (Ballard’s mother met with social worker and planned trip as an end-of-life goal).  
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B. Risk of Abuse 
While scholars can rationalize Ballard by emphasizing the legitimacy 
of hospice care and terminally ill care, Ballard does not explicitly limit its 
decision to cases involving people who are terminally-ill.
250
 Employers’ 
biggest concern likely surrounds the precedent that the Ballard decision 
sets.
251
 This fear has likely already been realized in Gienapp v. Harbor 
Crest, a subsequent Seventh Circuit case applying Ballard to a non-
terminal case.
252
 In Gienapp, an employer terminated an employee who 
had taken FMLA leave to care for her adult daughter during her daughter’s 
battle with thyroid cancer.
253
 The daughter was not terminally ill, but she 
needed her mother to babysit her children, the employee’s 
grandchildren.
254
 Gienapp’s employer claimed that providing childcare to 
grandchildren made the employee ineligible for FMLA leave.
255
 The 
Seventh Circuit relied on Ballard in holding that the employee met the 
definition of care under the FMLA because her childcare services provided 
relief and rest for the employee’s daughter.256  
Gienapp follows the broad understanding of care that was championed 
in Ballard, but it also failed to address concerns of abuse and the added 
detriment this expanded definition places on employers. In many ways, 
Gienapp presents a weaker case. First, the care the employee provided to 
her daughter was not as central to the daughter’s cancer battle as the care 
that Ballard provided to her dying mother.
257
 But for Ballard’s presence, 
Ballard’s mother would never have been able to go to Las Vegas.258 But 
for Gienapp’s babysitting, Gienapp’s daughter’s battle against thyroid 
cancer would have continued, and Gienapp’s daughter likely would have 
 
 
 250. Id. at 838 (articulating its understanding of care without specific reference to care for the 
terminally ill).  
 251. See, e.g., Jeff Nowak, supra note 2.  
 252. Gienapp v. Harbor Crest, 756 F.3d 527 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 253. Id. at 528.  
 254. Id. at 531. 
 255. Id. at 532. 
 256. Id. (“[T]he issue [is] whether a combination of assistance to one’s daughter, plus care of 
grandchildren that could take a load off the daughter’s mind and feet, counts as ‘care’ under the 
[FMLA]. To this the answer must be yes. Ballard explains that care includes psychological as well as 
physical assistance . . . .”).  
 257. The court acknowledged that Gienapp was not her daughter’s primary caregiver, yet this did 
not disqualify her eligibility to take FMLA leave because the FMLA does not specify the employee 
must be the primary caregiver. Id. at 531 (discussing 29 U.S.C. §2612(a)(1)(c)). Ballard, on the other 
hand, was her mother’s primary caretaker. Ballard v. Chi. Park Dist., 900 F. Supp. 2d 804, 806 (N.D. 
Ill. 2012).  
 258. Ballard, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 812 (“[Ballard’s] mother’s basic medical, hygienic, and 
nutritional needs could not be met without Ballard’s assistance.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss3/8
  
 
 
 
 
2017] DYING FOR LEAVE 735 
 
 
 
 
managed her childcare.
259
 Therefore, the necessity of the care appears 
much weaker in Gienapp.
260
 Second, the Gienapp decision does not offer 
any evidence from a medical professional regarding the grandmother’s 
contributions. In Ballard, the trip to Las Vegas was planned, in part, by 
key professionals who were actively involved in Ballard’s mother’s 
care.
261
 Instead, the Gienapp decision states, “[a] person who knows that 
her family is well looked-after has an important resource in trying to 
recover from a medical challenge.”262 Instead of relying on the heavy 
involvement of healthcare professionals, as was the case in Ballard, 
Gienapp does not rely on any expert testimony regarding the positive 
effect of the employee’s care. 
The absence of a healthcare professional’s opinion regarding Gienapp’s 
care highlights the detriment that a broad definition of care may have on 
an employer, and such precedent increases the likelihood of FMLA 
abuse.
263
 Ballard attempted to calm fears of abuse by drawing direct lines 
between the care provided by Ballard with the care plan devised by the 
patient’s healthcare providers.264 In addition, Ballard also references the 
employer’s right to healthcare-provider certification.265 Gienapp took the 
expanded understanding of care adopted in Ballard but the Gienapp court 
did not incorporate any direct support for the employee’s care from a 
healthcare professional.  
Under the FMLA, an employer has the right to request that the leave-
seeking employee obtain and submit supporting certification from the 
family member’s physician.266 The employer may also request 
recertification at various points throughout the leave.
267
 Certification asks 
the physician to affirm that the employee is indeed needed to care for the 
employee’s eligible family member and provide an estimated length of 
 
 
 259. Gienapp, 756 F.3d at 531. 
 260. Id. at 532. 
 261. Ballard v. Chi. Park Dist., 741 F.3d 838, 839, 843 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 262. Gienapp, 756 F.3d at 532. 
 263. See Jeff Nowak, Did a Court Just Allow an Employee FMLA Leave to Care for Her 
Grandchild? FMLA INSIGHTS (July 11, 2014) http://www.fmlainsights.com/did-a-court-just-allow-an-
employee-fmla-leave-to-care-for-her-grandchild/ (arguing the “Seventh Circuit’s expansive reading of 
the “caring for” provision of the FMLA takes the [FMLA] statute too far.”).  
 264. Ballard, 741 F.3d at 843 (“[A]ny worries about opportunistic leave-taking in this case should 
be tempered by the fact that this dispute arises out of the hospice and palliative care context.”).  
 265. Id. at 841 (“[A]n employer concerned about the risk that employees will abuse the FMLA’s 
leave provisions may of course require that requests be certified by the family member’s health care 
provider.” (referencing 29 U.S.C. § 2613 (2012)).  
 266. 29 U.S.C. § 2613. 
 267. See Parsley v. City of Columbus, 471 F. Supp. 2d 858 (S.D. Ohio 2006). For an in-depth 
discussion on the certification provision of the FMLA, see Kalich, supra note 89.  
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time that the care will be needed.
268
 Encouraging skeptical employers to 
request certifications could help curtail the potential for FMLA-leave 
abuse, and its absence in Gienapp suggests that caring for a family 
member with a serious health condition is held to less scrutiny in the 
Seventh Circuit as compared to other circuits. 
Gienapp erodes any notion that Ballard expanded upon the FMLA’s 
meaning of care when applied to family members who are terminally ill.
269
 
Instead, it supports the conclusion that Ballard interpreted the meaning of 
care in the FMLA to be applied broadly and subject to minimal oversight 
from medical professionals.
270
 Finally, Gienapp confirmed that the Ballard 
decision expanded the meaning of care beyond the interpretations of other 
circuits without clear boundaries. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Family and Medical Leave Act enables Ballard to take time off 
from her job to care for her mother who was terminally ill by escorting her 
mother on an end-of-life trip to Las Vegas, Nevada. The Ballard decision 
enabled the Seventh Circuit to incorporate aspects of end-of-life care that 
ordinarily would not meet the meaning of care under the FMLA, resulting 
in a split among the circuits on the meaning of care while traveling. Yet, 
both the district court and the Seventh Circuit failed to explicitly state that 
the hospice care factor justifies such an expansion in the meaning of care. 
When the Ballard decision is re-examined in the end-of-life care context, 
the holding becomes much more rational and consistent with the FMLA .  
When viewed in the light of hospice care, Ballard conforms to societal 
views that the dying deserves compassion and dignity, even when medical 
intervention ceases. However, the Seventh Circuit’s ruling failed to place 
any limitation on its expanded definition or offer guidance on where the 
line should be drawn. This absence disregards Congress’s intent to balance 
needs of employees with the needs of employers. As a result, Ballard has 
already been used as precedent to further stretch the meaning of care 
beyond that of any other circuit, likely going beyond Congress’s intentions 
for the FMLA. Until the Seventh Circuit delineates the meaning of care, 
perhaps by narrowing its meaning in the hospice and non-hospice context, 
 
 
 268. 29 U.S.C. § 2613(b)(4)(a). 
 269. While Gienapp’s daughter was facing a life-threatening medical battle, she was never 
considered terminally ill. At the time the case was published, Gienapp’s daughter was in remission. Id. 
at 529. 
 270. Ballard, 741 F.3d at 843. 
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employers should be wary of denying FMLA leave to an employee caring 
for a family member who is terminally ill or even a dangerously ill. 
Katherine Vaky
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thank her mother, Debbie, who has cared for her aging parents with strength and love while still 
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note is dedicated to the sandwiched generation who balances aging parents, children, and employment.  
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